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Entrepreneurial Choice: 
Restoring a Relevant Antitrust 
Policy 
Warren Grimes† 
Abstract 
Current antitrust orthodoxy focuses on short-term price/output 
factors. This increasingly criticized model does not adequately protect 
competition in industries in which individuals and small firms thrive. 
Small entrepreneurs may be efficient for a variety of reasons, including 
the incentives that flow from owner operation, the personal relation-
ships that lead to superior service, or the strong creative component of 
the business. Despite advantages in efficiencies and superior willingness 
to innovate, small providers have been forced out of the market by 
intended or unintended effects of antitrust enforcement decisions and 
regulatory initiatives. This Article explores the concept of entrepre-
neurial choice and its application to small entrepreneurs. Recognizing 
the metric of entrepreneurial choice, along with consumer choice, is 
critical to protecting competition and restoring antitrust relevancy. To 
address these issues, the Article examines shortcomings in enforcement 
and regulatory policies in three critical industries—agriculture, 
healthcare, and communications and entertainment—and compares 
these industries to the wine and beer industries, where creative small 
entrepreneurs have a revitalized presence. This Article concludes by 
offering an approach for protecting efficient and in-demand small entre-
preneurs while enhancing life choices for consumer and seller alike. In 
industries in which small entrepreneurs are efficient, this formula 
includes enhanced merger control, more vigorous antitrust enforcement 
to maintain open distribution, and greater tolerance for small seller col-
lective actions needed to offset monopsony power. 
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Foer, John Kwoka, Christopher Sagers, and Spencer Waller for comments on 
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Introduction  
Current antitrust orthodoxy focuses on short-term price and output 
factors in determining what constitutes an antitrust violation.1 Under 
this approach, mergers to tight oligopoly or oligopsony have been 
permitted and little attention has been paid to distribution restraints 
that stifle entry. Enforcement policies, it turns out, are particularly 
suspect when it comes to protecting individuals and small firms that 
efficiently perform in industries suited to small entrepreneurship. A 
focus on entrepreneurial choice—the flip side of protecting consumer 
 
1. For criticism of this approach, see generally How the Chicago School 
Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic 
Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (examining 
predominant interpretations of conservative economic theory); Jonathan Baker, 
Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s 
Right, 80 Antitrust L.J. 1, 7 (2015) (arguing that the application of the 
“error cost” framework relies on erroneous economic assumptions and yields “a 
non-interventionist bias” to any conclusions); Stacy Mitchell, View from the 
Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of America’s Small Businesses, 61 Antitrust 
Bull. 498, 502 (2016) (explaining how orthodox antitrust policy has undermined 
creative and innovative small businesses’ ability to flourish and compete against 
larger firms); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L. 
J. 710, 717–46 (2017) (offering an extensive critique of the price/output model 
as background for assessment of Amazon). See also Einer Elhauge, Horizontal 
Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1271–72 (2016) (explaining how 
institutional shareholders with substantial holdings in major rival firms in an 
industry reduce competition in oligopolistic industries and how this 
development may be linked to increasing concentration of wealth in fewer 
hands). 
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choice—starkly highlights the shortcomings of a focus on price and 
output. 
This Article examines how greater sensitivity to protection of the 
efficient individual entrepreneur or small firm—one that offers products 
and services in demand—can enhance efficiencies, promote innovation, 
provide needed guidance for regulatory initiatives, and increase the 
quality of life for both consumers and those who provide critical pro-
ducts and services. This approach has the added benefit of enhancing 
democratic values through dispersed economic power. 
After first describing the concept of entrepreneurial choice in Part 
I, Part II focuses on the efficiencies and other advantages that explain 
the resilience of small firms and solo-practicing service providers. Part 
III examines some of the perverse effects of antitrust and regulation in 
three key industries: agriculture, healthcare, and telecommunications 
and entertainment. By way of contrast, Part IV examines why small 
providers have mounted a comeback in the beer and wine industries. 
This Article concludes that consumer and entrepreneurial choice should 
be given greater weight in setting antitrust and regulatory policies, par-
ticularly for industries suited for small entrepreneurs. Part V provides 
suggestions on how this might be done. 
I. Entrepreneurial Choice 
How do you buy what you eat? Do you shop primarily in 
supermarkets that are part of large regional or national chains? Would 
you prefer to have the choice of also buying from local farmers, whose 
products might be more expensive, but who offer enhanced freshness 
and genuine organic options? 
How do you get your healthcare? Do you rely on an HMO or an 
insurance-company controlled medical plan that excludes some phy-
sicians from the network? Would you prefer to deal with a solo-
practicing or small-practice physician whom you trust and who has 
longstanding ties to your family? 
What are your choices for home video entertainment? Do you rely 
on traditional cable programming supplied by large vertically inte-
grated firms that control both distribution and content? Do you prefer 
the more open-ended options provided by the internet? 
Answers to these questions will vary. Most of us, however, value 
choices and the opportunity to change our mind. Recognition that 
meaningful choices are a vital part of competition is hardly novel. In 
1776, Adam Smith wrote that “the private interests and passions of 
men” lead them to allocate resources “as nearly as possible in the pro-
portion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society.”2 
 
2. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations 594–95 (Edwin Cannan ed., Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937) (1776). 
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In focusing on how naturally occurring competition controlled 
allocation, Smith was cognizant of the preferences “of the whole 
society.”3 Both consumer and entrepreneurial choice were implicit in his 
approach. By 1890, the Sherman Act’s proponents were not in the least 
reticent about their goal of protecting the small entrepreneur, partic-
ularly small farmers and ranchers—a theme that continues to be echoed 
in modern treatises.4 
The antitrust approach to large firms has long focused on balancing 
their potential efficiencies against the risk of oligopolistic conduct—
conduct that can directly affect downstream buyers and consumers. The 
oligopsony risks associated with large firms have received less attention. 
In 1966, Donald Turner, then Assistant Attorney General, addressed 
the issues raised by concentrated industries and focused on seller power 
and pricing.5 Turner did not mention buyer-power risks. Half a century 
later, although the literature has expanded our understanding of buyer-
power abuses,6 the Turner observations still reflect a mainstream anti-
trust focus on seller power. 
 
In an earlier sentence in the same paragraph, Smith’s focus on the well-being of 
society as a whole is also evident: “[T]he private interests and passions of 
individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments 
which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to the society.” Id. at 594. 
3. Id. at 595. 
4. See infra notes 37–43 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of the 
Sherman Act proponents). In their venerable treatise, Scherer and Ross describe 
the value of entrepreneurial choice: “A . . . political merit of a competitive 
market is its freedom of opportunity. . . . Individuals are free to choose whatever 
trade or profession they prefer, limited only by their own talent and skill and 
by their ability to raise the (presumably modest) amount of capital required.” 
F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and 
Economic Performance 19 (3d ed. 1990). 
5. An Interview with the Honorable Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General 
in Charge of the Antitrust Division, 30 Antitrust L.J. 100, 103–04 (1966) 
(“[N]on-competitive pricing and other non-competitive behavior in oligopoly 
industries is a matter of serious concern, as indeed it has been for a long time.”). 
It is possible that Turner used the words monopoly and oligopoly to cover both 
seller- and buyer-power issues, but such usage would also suggest the lack of 
focus on buyer-power issues. 
6. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Monopsony: 
Antitrust Law and Economics (1993); Clayton J. Masterman, Note, The 
Customer Is Not Always Right: Balancing Worker and Customer Welfare in 
Antitrust Law, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1413 (2016); John B. Kirkwood, Powerful 
Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1485, 1491–92 (2012); Peter 
C. Carstensen, Buying Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive 
Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers, 53 Antitrust Bull. 271, 276 (2008); 
Warren S. Grimes, Buyer Power and Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting 
Competition and the Atomistic Seller, 72 Antitrust L.J. 563, 563 (2005). 
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On the demand side, the Supreme Court has recognized that one of 
the goals of competition law is the protection of consumer choice.7 
Antitrust theorists have provided rich supportive commentary that de-
scribes the benefits of sensitivity to consumer choice issues.8 Protecting 
the choices and opportunities of a vulnerable atomistic seller would 
seem a natural corollary when the power lies not with the large seller 
but with large buyers who can coerce the small seller. 
The connection between consumer choice and entrepreneurial 
choice is direct. If small firms that offer services and products consumers 
want are driven from the marketplace, consumer choice is undercut. 
When a relatively small craft brewer sells a popular product, but cannot 
survive because of lax antitrust enforcement or misguided regulatory 
policy, the loss in choice falls not only on the would-be craft brewer, 
but also on the consumer. Meaningful consumer choice exists when 
market structure allows for new entry and sustainability for small firms 
that offer what consumers want. Maintaining entrepreneurial choice is 
also linked to dynamic efficiency. A small firm with a novel idea appeal-
ing to consumers can have a difficult time sustaining its entry if large 
existing competitors can engage in exclusionary conduct. Innovation 
can be delayed or suppressed.9 
The protection of entrepreneurial choice should not be a ticket for 
favored treatment of small firms. What should be protected is a right 
to compete on the merits, unhindered by exclusionary or abusive con-
duct by large firms and as free as possible of government regulation 
that discriminates against the small provider. 
 
7. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“[T]he 
assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free 
market recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and 
durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free 
opportunity to select among alternative offers.”) (emphasis added). See also FTC 
v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (“[A]n agreement limiting 
consumer choice by impeding the ‘ordinary give and take of the market 
place,’ . . . cannot be sustained under the Rule of Reason.”) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y 
of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692); United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 
453–56 (1964) (discussing the role played by price differences and buyer 
preferences in influencing consumer choice and creating competition). 
8. Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 503, 504–05 (2001); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The 
Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing 
Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 191, 192 (2008). 
9. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 301–03 (2d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (addressing conspiracy to delay 
introduction of a new electronic flash device developed by General Electric); 
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 508 (canvassing evidence that small businesses are 
superior innovators). 
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Properly viewed, the connection between competition law and 
government regulation is straightforward. If competition law is effective 
in preserving competition, the need for government regulation should 
be minimized.10 Where regulation is needed—as it may be for health 
and safety reasons—the regulation ought to show the same sensitivity 
for survival of small firms that antitrust policy should show. 
Regulations that are designed for, and sometimes at the behest of, large 
firms can and often do undermine entry, competition, and entrepre–
neurial choice. 
II. When Small Can Be Superior to Big 
Today, Americans are accustomed to big corporations that provide 
sophisticated or high-tech products our predecessors could only imag-
ine. Airplanes, automobiles, sophisticated drugs, computers, and other 
digital products are examples. Many every-day consumables, including 
processed food, cigarettes, toothpaste, and laundry detergent are the 
products of very large firms. Critical sectors of retailing are now 
dominated by large chains. 
Despite the prominence of large firms and downturns in the number 
of newly created and surviving small businesses,11 a great deal of what 
is bought and sold in the marketplace continues to flow through 
individuals or relatively small businesses. That was true in 1890 and 
remains true today. According to Census data, 78.5 percent of all firms 
with paid employees had fewer than ten employees.12 The largest 
number of employer firms operate in professional, scientific and tech-
nical services, retail trade, construction, and health care and social 
assistance.13 Small firms and atomistic providers still have a major 
presence in most service professions, in providing food and drink, in the 
arts, and in other creative professions. For example, there is high con-
centration among firms that provide auditing services for large business 
entities, but there remain hundreds of smaller or solo-practicing 
 
10. See, e.g., Scherer & Ross, supra note 4, at 18 (“The resource allocation and 
income distribution problem is solved through the . . . forces on the market, 
and not through the conscious exercise of power held in government hands (that 
is, under state enterprise or government regulation).”). 
11. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 502 (citing evidence of the decline in numbers and 
market share of small businesses in manufacturing and retailing). 
12. Nearly 1 in 10 Businesses with Employees Are New, According to Inaugural 
Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, Commerce.gov (Sept. 1, 2016, 12:08 PM), 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/blog/2016/09/nearly-1-10-businesses-
employees-are-new-according-inaugural-annual-survey [https://perma.cc/4 
V6P-JGNC]. 
13. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Restoring a Relevant Antitrust Policy 
67 
accountants that ply their trade for small firms or individuals.14 In the 
healthcare industry, HMOs and large group practices are increasingly 
common, but solo and small-practice physicians remain very much in 
demand. And, while we shop for consumables at giant supermarket 
chains or big box retailers, Americans have not lost interest in buying 
from local farmers’ markets, in drinking the products of local or regional 
craft brewers or winemakers, or in dining at locally owned eateries. 
Consumer dissatisfaction is often high when we are forced to deal with 
large service providers, particularly when choice is limited as with large 
cable television and telecom providers. 
There are obvious issues involving small businesses. Many are short 
lived. According to a 2016 Census release, over 481,000 firms with paid 
employees, or 8.9 percent of the total, had been in business for less than 
two years while only 3.1 percent of firms have been in business for 
sixteen or more years.15 Many small firms struggle on subsistence earn-
ings. Two percent of employer firms had annual receipts of less than 
$10,000; only 25.8 percent of employer firms had receipts of $1 million 
or more.16 Small businesses also probably make up a large share of 
businesses involved in deceptive or fraudulent conduct, or operating 
outside the regulatory framework. 
Despite these issues, small business remains resilient and, in many 
sectors, the preferred way of doing business. Small enterprises thrive in 
industries that typically fit in one or more of the following categories: 
(1) owner-operated businesses that can operate efficiently on a small 
scale; (2) professionals or other service providers; (3) artists, writers, or 
athletes whose success is determined by individual initiative and crea-
tivity; and (4) producers who sell customized products or who otherwise 
require a high degree of personal contact with customers or suppliers. 
There are obvious explanations for why many industries have 
remained fertile ground for small business. The first is that these 
industries may operate more efficiently, flexibly, innovatively, and re-
sponsively to local demand when left in the hands of individuals or 
small firms. The second is that, regardless of economic advantage, both 
the providers and the customers may prefer the personal contact 
characteristic of small business. 
 
14. Jessica Fritz, Who Audits Public Companies—2016 Edition, AuditAnalytics 
(June 7, 2016), http://www.auditanalytics.com/blog/who-audits-public-
companies-2016-edition/ [https://perma.cc/LH9W-KUM6] (noting that for 
smaller companies publicly reporting, none of the Big Four accounting firms 
have a substantial market share). 
15. Nearly 1 in 10 Businesses with Employees Are New, According to Inaugural 
Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, supra note 12. 
16. Id. 
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A. The Efficiencies of Small Businesses 
A primary efficiency harnessed by a franchise system is the 
individual franchisee’s entrepreneurial energy—a quality that may be 
lacking when individual retail outlets are owned by a large firm.17 
Salaried store managers may lack the same incentive to work the extra 
hours that a franchise owner possesses.18 The franchise owner may also 
have substantial authority and flexibility to address day-to-day prob-
lems in the outlet’s operation. 
What is true for franchising will hold with greater force for an 
owner-operated small business. As compared to a franchisee, the owner-
operator has more flexibility to change inventory, location, selling 
methods, hours of operation, etc. The owner-operator also avoids the 
incentive for disloyal agency that can be a problem when a firm gives 
responsibility for purchasing to managers. Using the firm’s money to 
purchase services or inventory, there is a risk that the manager, in 
breach of her fiduciary duty, will favor a non-competitive supplier be-
cause of an under-the-table payment, a family tie, or other personal 
relationships.19 An owner-operator can enter into disadvantageous com-
mercial relationships only at her own cost. 
Big businesses can have economies of scale and scope that small 
firms lack. A large producer can streamline production and marketing 
in ways that a smaller rival cannot. For many types of manufacturing, 
processing, and distribution, the advantages of scale can be sub-
stantial.20 In addition, economies of scope are enjoyed by multi-product 
firms such as Proctor & Gamble. Its diverse offerings of consumer 
products give it a deep pool of resources, an ability to jointly promote 
and distribute multiple products, and insulation against failure if one 
 
17. See Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise 
Contract, 21 J. L. & Econ. 223, 226–29 (1978) (discussing how incentives 
promote franchisee efficiency). See also Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The 
Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. & Econ. 345, 350 
n. 20 (1985) (“[T]he incentive for workers to supply effort that is not explicitly 
specified and measurable by the employer . . . is harvested by franchising 
managements.”).  
18. Large firms that hire local managers can lessen but not eliminate this incentive 
problem by paying the manager a percentage of profits generated by the 
managed outlet. 
19. See, e.g., Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F. 3d 1201, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(finding local manager of national enterprise breached his fiduciary duty by 
favoring his own scaffolding firm over that owned by the enterprise). 
20. Achieving scale efficiencies may require large firms, but often not to the point 
of dominance or oligopoly. See Joe S. Bain, Advantages of the Large Firm: 
Production, Distribution, and Sales Promotion, 20 J. Marketing 336, 345–
46 (1956) (finding that in many industries achieving minimum efficient scale 
did not require a highly concentrated industry structure). 
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of its lines should flounder. Not all efficiency advantages, however, favor 
the large firm. 
A prominent business theorist wrote that large companies “make 
fewer but bigger errors, tend to continue wrong policies too long, and 
have the resources to delay until crisis is unmistakable.”21 Another 
observed that “[a] big organization is bureaucratic, harder to inspire 
and energize, and much less likely to respond to the energies of a few 
creative people.”22 As a firm becomes larger, its bureaucratic structure 
makes it more difficult to trace costs and benefits of creative conduct 
within the organization.23 There is strong anecdotal evidence to support 
the view that large firms are more subject to the momentum of the 
status quo and less willing to experiment and innovate. A petroleum 
industry expert, focusing on the waste and pollution caused when meth-
ane or natural gas is burned at a drilling source rather than captured 
and distributed, suggested that innovation addressing this problem is 
likely to come from small firms, not giant firms that tend to be cautious 
about change.24 The giant Bell Corporation, a dominant firm in offering 
telephone service throughout most of the twentieth century, did not 
introduce automatic switching machines until well after a number of 
 
21. Corporate Takeovers (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., 
Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 259 (1985) (testimony of Warren A. Law, Edmund Cogswell 
Converse Professor of Finance, Harvard Business School). Professor Law 
continued: “Corporate history is replete with examples. In the absence of 
compelling technical advantages of large size, there is ground to prefer small 
productive units to large.” Id. 
22. Alonzo L. McDonald, Of Floating Factories and Mating Dinosaurs, 64 Harv. 
Bus. Rev. 82, 83 (1986). 
23. M. S. Moyer, The Roots of Large Scale Retailing, J. Marketing, Oct. 1962, 
at 55, 57 (“In the large organization, responsibility for the attainment of profit 
objectives must be apportioned and reapportioned many times. . . . Costs tend 
to become nontraceable.”). 
24. Oil Innovators See Opportunity Amid Record Low Prices, PBS Newshour 
(Aug. 25, 2015, 6:20 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/oil-innovators-
see-opportunity-amid-record-low-prices [https://perma.cc/2WDH-7ZLJ]. 
The segment described the wasted natural gas that escapes during drilling, 
typically polluting when burned at the site, and quoted industry expert Carl 
Larry: 
We need a Steve Jobs in oil and gas. We need somebody who is going 
to go out there and take a chance. Big companies aren’t. They’re just 
going to keep their budgets going doing what they do right now and 
making money. But the ones who take the chances are the small 
businesses, the people who have the guts to take it out and try 
something new. 
 Id. 
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smaller telephone companies had adopted this innovation.25 Recent 
empirical evidence supports anecdotal accounts that small firms are 
often a superior engine for innovation.26 
Those economies that favor large size are, in any event, likely far 
more limited in the service professions, in businesses that involve 
extensive service for the customer, or creative component industries. In 
any industry in which there is a strong service component, economies 
of scale are achieved at lower size levels and there is heightened need 
for close and nurtured relationships between buyer and seller.27 One 
management expert estimates that the optimum size of a professional 
service organization “is probably between 35 and 100 people.”28 Not 
only do economies of scale end as firm size increases—large agglom-
erations of service providers are likely to incur diseconomies.29 One 
example is a large law firm. The firm’s size has some advantages, such 
as its ability to refer clients to specialists within the firm. But there are 
large firm inefficiencies, such as added supervisory costs, resolving profit 
and benefit allocations among participants, and resolving potential 
conflicts of interest among its many clients.30 
The banking industry provides an example of the relevance of size 
in a service-oriented industry. Large banks have the resources and 
expertise to make substantial loans to multinational businesses, 
sometimes by forming consortia involving other large lending institu-
tions. A community bank would not be suited to this task. However, 
when it comes to the banking services that a small business or a 
 
25. Sheldon Hochheiser, Electromechanical Telephone-Switching, Engineering & 
Tech. Hist. Wiki, http://ethw.org/Electromechanical_Telephone-Switching 
[https://perma.cc/ZRC8-CMF2] (last updated Jan. 9, 2015, 5:22 PM) (stating 
that AT&T Bell had automatic switching technology as early as 1903, but 
resisted adopting the systems). 
26. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 508 (citing Wilfred Dolfsma & Gerben van der 
Velde, Industry Innovativeness, Firm Size, and Entrepreneurship: Schumpeter 
Mark III?, 24 J. Evolutionary Econ. 713, 728 (2014)) (noting research 
finding that industries populated with small businesses generate new products 
and services at a faster rate than oligopoly dominated industries). 
27. See Michael D. Johnson & Fred Selnes, Customer Portfolio Management: 
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Exchange Relationships, J. Marketing, Apr. 
2004, at 1, 15 (“[T]he more a firm is positioned toward product offerings with 
low economies of scale (i.e., high personal-service component), the stronger it 
must be in developing and keeping closer relationships.”). 
28. McDonald, supra note 22, at 83 (“When you have more than 100 professionals 
under one roof, extra layers of supervision are common, indeed inescapable, and 
the organization becomes overregimented.”). 
29. Id. 
30. See id. (“Each layer [of supervision] adds expense, but not necessarily benefit 
to the client.”).  
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consumer needs, community banks perform very well, often better than 
their larger rivals.31 A prominent former IMF economist estimated that 
the most efficient size of a bank is under $10 billion in assets.32 Perhaps 
because of fewer levels of bureaucratic overlay, small banks—when 
compared to their largest competitors—provide banking services at 
lower charges, lend more to small businesses, and have lower default 
rates.33 These findings are hardly surprising. Banking is a service-
intensive industry where personal relationships matter and where 
knowledge of local conditions can be critical. As with other service 
oriented industries examined here, maintaining the rules of competition 
so that small banks may enter and survive serves both efficiency and 
quality of life goals. 
B. Creativity 
The notion that a Beethoven Symphony could not have been 
written by committee is relevant in many areas of the creative arts. 
Successful writers may have contracts with publishers. Producers, direc-
tors, and screen writers in entertainment are often employed by the 
major studios. But a beautiful painting, a soaring musical work, and a 
good book are typically the work of a single individual, who then may 
sell it to a firm for production or publication. Lennon and McCartney, 
while collaborating on memorable tracks, did not take orders from a 
corporate superior. Screen plays may be collaborations, some of them 
under a large corporate umbrella. Still, creation of film and video pro-
grams remains a creative occupation with many individuals and small 
firms pressing to offer new content.34 
Individual efforts are also at the core of those who present and 
entertain, including actors, musicians, and athletes. Creative indi-
viduals could well be stifled or repressed if they are subject to the 
regimen of a large firm. The inherent advantages of individual perfor-
mance in the creative world is demonstrated when, even among nations 
that have experimented with centrally planned economies, creators and 
performers have maintained a high degree of independence. 
 
31. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 505–06 (noting that community banks charge 
lower fees, have lower default rates on loans, and lend a greater proportion of 
money to small businesses). 
32. Implications of the “Volcker Rules” for Financial Stability: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 47 (2010) 
(statement of Simon Johnson, Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship, 
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
33. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 505–06. 
34. The number of independent artists, writers, and performers is estimated to be 
over 765,000. Roland J. Kushner & Randy Cohen, National Arts 
Index 2016: An Annual Measure of the Vitality of Arts and 
Culture in the United States: 2002–2013 39 (2016). 
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C. Lifestyle Preferences for Entrepreneurial Independence 
Another reason for the resilience of small or individually owned 
firms is that both the suppliers and customers prefer to do business this 
way. Simply put, for most people, “the smaller the work unit, the 
greater the satisfaction.”35 Efficient or not, many service providers, 
small retailers, farmers, and fishermen want to own and manage their 
own business. Collectively, small retailers offer a rich variety of choices 
that consumers continue to patronize—the best indication that this 
distribution method is attractive to both buyers and sellers. Most small 
restaurants are not highly profitable and may struggle to survive. They 
are nonetheless able to maintain a loyal customer base, capture entre-
preneurial incentives from the owner, and become a vital part of the 
local economy. People in the creative arts often work for the love of 
their craft. J.K. Rowling notwithstanding, many writers and actors 
struggle to survive in a line of work about which they are passionate.36 
This preference for independence can of course be linked to 
efficiencies. An owner who is sweeping the floor of a small retail business 
may do so more willingly and with more enthusiasm than an employee 
would. There is, however, value in the non-efficiency related level of 
satisfaction that the owner manager enjoys. To ignore this value is to 
move antitrust policy toward an impersonal and Orwellian world diffi-
cult to reconcile with Sherman Act values. 
III. Antitrust and Regulatory Failures in Three 
Critical Industries 
The lives of both consumers and industry participants are adversely 
affected when antitrust and regulatory policy do not adequately protect 
entrepreneurial choice. Antitrust failures include tepid merger enforce-
ment that has allowed large buyers to merge to tight oligopsony. When 
these oligopsonists employ exclusionary purchasing tactics that harm 
individual or small-firm sellers, orthodox antitrust policy and Supreme 
Court procedural decisions have often denied small sellers an antitrust 
remedy. Finally, when vulnerable individuals or small firms engage in 
collective action to counter oligopsony power, they can themselves be-
come targets of antitrust enforcement directed at collective action. 
Three critical industries examined below illustrate these points. 
 
35. McDonald, supra note 22, at 83. 
36. See Kushner & Kohen, supra note 34, at 39 (“Many independent artists ply 
their cultural trade on a part-time basis, combining arts entrepreneurship with 
other jobs and work.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Restoring a Relevant Antitrust Policy 
73 
A. Agriculture 
In 1890, and for at least the three decades that followed, agriculture 
and the Sherman Act were joined at the hip. Rural Americans were a 
key constituency pressing for antitrust legislation—support that was 
illustrated by the frequent references to agriculture in congressional de-
bates.37 Key targets were processors and the rail industry that trans-
ported goods to processors.38 What followed were key enforcement 
initiatives directed at railroads,39 meat packing,40 tobacco,41 and oil.42 
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 further buttressed the enforce-
ment framework intended to protect competition considered vital for 
farmers and ranchers.43 
By the mid-twentieth century, agriculture was no longer the focus 
of antitrust enforcement. Even private enforcement actions that might 
have aided small farmers fell on hard times44 as the Supreme Court 
stiffened procedural and substantive requirements. In Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,45 the Court did not address buyer-power 
issues and followed simplistic Chicago School logic in reversing a lower 
court decision that would have thwarted further consolidation of the 
beef packing industry.46 
Levels of concentration tolerated in seller-power industries are 
anathema when the same firms exercise buyer power over vulnerable, 
atomistic sellers. Plant and animal products that spoil or become less 
 
37. 21 Cong. Rec. 2,470–71 (1890) (statement of Sen. Allison) (citing concerns 
from his farmer constituents about trusts in Chicago suppressing the price of 
cattle); see also Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: 
Origination of an American Tradition 143 (1955) (discussing farm 
organizations’ political involvement). 
38. Thorelli, supra note 37, at 58–60. 
39. N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
40. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
41. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
42. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910). Standard Oil was 
accused in part of facilitating railroad cartels. Id. at 32–33. 
43. Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-51, 42 Stat. 159 (codified 
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181–229 (2012)). 
44. Private plaintiffs had a notable mid-twentieth century success in Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (forbidding 
sugar refiners’ conspiracy to suppress the price paid for sugar beets). 
45. 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
46. Id. at 119. See Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A New Direction for 
Agricultural Law, 75 N.D. L. Rev. 449, 503–04 (1999) (criticizing Cargill and 
other merger cases that failed to address supplier issues and noting that buyer-
power issues were not squarely addressed in the Cargill briefs). 
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valuable after a prime selling time increase the vulnerability of a small 
seller to a powerful buyer.47 Geographic limits on buyer markets are a 
critical issue for farmers and ranchers. That meat processing plants may 
be relatively unconcentrated in national terms is irrelevant to a rancher 
who must find a buyer quickly and, because of substantial trans-
portation costs, in a relatively limited geographic area. The farmer’s 
vulnerability to powerful buyers is borne out by a model that showed 
prices received by a hog farmer dropped in direct correlation to the 
degree of concentration among meat packers.48 Today, meat processing 
is highly concentrated nationally, and even more so when one considers 
the limited geographic market available for those selling livestock.49 
Choice of product is also an issue. Many consumers prefer to eat 
beef from cattle raised on a natural grass-fed diet.50 The market, 
however, can be distorted by the power of oligopolistic processors. In 
the United States, industrial ranching practices call for cattle, around 
one year of age, to be removed from pastures where they consumed a 
biologically suited grass diet.51 They are then stacked into two story 
trucks and transported for up to twenty hours with no food or drink to 
crowded feedlots that contain up to 18,000 cattle.52 From this point on, 
the animals can no longer graze, but are fed diets consisting of corn and 
soybeans, sometimes supplemented with candy to increase animal 
weight, the slaughterhouse remains of chickens, pigs, or other cows, 
plastic pellets to add the fiber that would be in the natural grass diet, 
and even waste material taken from a chicken coop consisting of chicken 
feed and manure. The animals can also be dosed with hormones and 
 
47. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 
Cornell L. Rev. 297, 313 (1991) (explaining the vulnerability of a seller of a 
perishable product); Grimes, supra note 6, at 567–68 (same). See also Todd v. 
Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 211 (2d Cir. 2001) (making the related point that 
“[l]abor is an extremely perishable commodity—an hour not worked today can 
never be recovered” (citation omitted)). 
48. Philip Paarlberg et al., Structural Change and Market Performance in 
Agriculture: Critical Issues and Concerns About Concentration in the Pork 
Industry 6–7 (Dep’t Agric. Econ. Purdue Univ., Staff Paper No. 14, 1999) (a 
marketplace with twenty equally sized pork packers would pay about 5 percent 
less than a perfectly competitive marketplace; eight firms would pay 18 percent 
less; and four firms would pay 28 percent less). 
49. For example, 80 percent of the beef purchased in the U.S. is sold by the four 
largest processors. Andrea Rock, How Safe Is Your Beef?, Consumer Rep., 
Oct. 2015, at 26, 32. 
50. Georgina Gustin, Demand for Grass-Fed Beef is Growing, L.A. Times (Nov. 
23, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/business/la-fi-grassfed-beef-
20121123 [https://perma.cc/4RGG-XDEX]. 
51. Rock, supra note 49, at 27. 
52. Id. at 31. 
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antibiotics to prevent disease and promote growth. 53 In feed lots, they 
stand in areas of as little as twenty-three square feet per animal, the 
equivalent of a four-foot by six-foot enclosure, with no vegetation, a 
great deal of manure, and often lots of mud.54 Life in a feeding station 
can be from three months to a year before they are taken to a slaughter-
house.55 
These industrial practices are, in a narrow sense, efficient, and at 
least some of these savings may be passed on to consumers in the form 
of lower prices. Cattle raised in accord with industrial practices can be 
brought to slaughter weight as much as a year more quickly than an 
animal that stays on a natural, grass-fed diet. The beef from a grass-
fed animal, with no antibiotics added to its diet, can cost up to $3 more 
per pound, a reflection of the longer growth period and greater space 
requirements for the grass-fed animal.56 Using industrial methods, more 
cattle can be raised with a smaller land and labor footprint, so more 
beef can be supplied. 
The short-sighted industrial efficiency that prevails in beef 
production also governs in poultry. In the United States, the raising of 
chickens still is a hands-on job done by hundreds of small entrepreneurs 
who contract with a handful of very large chicken processors and dis-
tributors. Many find they are indebted to the processors for the costs 
of their equipment, are forced to upgrade their facilities at substantial 
cost, and—short of bankruptcy—must continue to struggle under op-
presssive conditions for themselves and their livestock.57 These 
conditions led one economist to compare the chicken farmer’s plight to 
economic serfdom.58 At the other end of the chain, factory-
commoditized chicken is available in supermarkets at relatively low 
prices, but consumer choice and quality is limited. 
The efficiencies of raising animals in crowded industrial conditions 
are open to question. There is evidence that free range chickens that 
can eat bugs, grubs, and worms as part of a natural diet produce smaller 
but more nutritious eggs, and that their eggs have thicker shells less 
 
53. Id. at 30–31. 
54. Id. at 27. 
55. Id. at 30. 
56. Id. at 32. 
57. C. Robert Taylor, ALFA Eminent Scholar Agric. & Pub. Policy, Auburn Univ., 
Comments presented at the Department of Justice & Federal Trade 
Commission Joint Workshop on Merger Enforcement 248–49 (Feb. 17, 2004) 
(transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2004/ 
02/ftcdoj-joint-workshop-merger-enforcement [https://perma.cc/ZRV8-Q53P]). 
58. Id. at 216. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Restoring a Relevant Antitrust Policy 
76 
prone to breakage.59 The workers who work with free-range chickens 
reportedly have fewer respiratory health issues than those who work in 
crowded chicken coops.60 Many of the additional costs to industrial 
farming are external costs that are passed on to society, among them 
the degradation of antibiotics that are fed to animals and ingested in 
small doses each time a consumer eats the meat.61 Other external costs 
are the environmental burden on society from the fecal dust and un-
welcome odors emanating from feed lots, the burden of disposing of 
large amounts of concentrated animal waste, and even the social welfare 
benefits that must be paid to some of the contract farmers or their em-
ployees because of poverty level income.62 
Some farmers have refused to follow industrial farming practices 
and raise animals following centuries old animal husbandry practices. 
They have an opportunity for success as fast food chains and super-
markets begin to offer alternatives to meat produced through industrial 
farming practices. The story, however, does not end here. 
The labels “organic,” “natural,” or “free range” have to some degree 
been coopted by large meat processors, who still find ways of short 
cutting traditional animal husbandry practices and selling their pro-
ducts with such labels. Chickens stuffed into crowded hen houses are 
given a small outside area to escape, then are sold as “free range.”63 
They are advertised as having no “antibiotics” added to their food, but 
cannot eat the natural diet of grubs, bugs, and worms that would 
produce eggs with thicker shells and the dark yellow yolks of a 
 
59. Daphne Miller, Farmacology, What Innovative Family Farming 
Can Teach Us About Health and Healing 106–10 (2013). 
60. Id. at 119–20. 
61. A Consumer Reports Study found that while bacteria are found in beef 
regardless of how the cattle are raised, there was a notable increase in certain 
types of bacteria, including those resistant to antibiotics, in beef from cattle 
sent to feedlots. Rock, supra note 49, at 29. 
62. James M. MacDonald & Penni Korb, U.S. Dep’t Agric. Econ. Res. 
Serv., Econ. Info. Bull. No. 72, Agricultural Contracting 
Update: Contracts in 2008 (Feb. 2011) at 1, 20 (finding that the mean 
household income from broiler-only operations amounted to $14,890 in 2008). 
Low-paying jobs of all sorts can result in society bearing external costs in the 
form of social-welfare benefits. For example, low-paid Wal-Mart workers have 
reportedly received state or federal welfare benefits. Abigail Goldman, Study 
Cites Social Costs of Wal-Mart, L.A. Times (Aug. 3, 2004), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2004/aug/03/business/fi-walmart3 [https://perma.cc/9MJH-PPKZ] 
(describing three surveys detailing state or federal assistance received by Wal-Mart 
employees). 
63. Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of 
Four Meals 169–73 (2006) (describing a tour of a large chicken-raising facility 
that markets eggs as organic and free range). 
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traditional free range chicken. These eggs might more accurately be 
labeled “industrial organic.”64 
These practices border on deceptive. Leaving aside any consumer-
protection issue, industrial organic farming makes it more difficult for 
a farmer and processor desiring to use traditional husbandry practices. 
Retailers that might otherwise be persuaded to carry the farmer’s gen-
uinely organic animal products will be pressured to carry instead the 
mass-produced industrial “organics.” These woes are compounded by 
federal regulation, which is designed to fit the industrial processor’s 
practices. For example, dominant chicken processors slaughter poultry 
in a large industrial facility that must meet USDA requirements for im-
permeable, white washed walls and antiseptic conditions.65 It is difficult 
for a small chicken farmer raising chickens under more natural con-
ditions to satisfy these requirements. The regulations do not require 
measuring the actual bacterial content of the slaughtered animals, 
which would seem the most relevant test.66 A small-volume organic 
processor may choose to slaughter the animals in a natural outdoor 
facility, which many believe results in the lowest bacteria exposure. 
That processor, however, may be out of compliance because it has no 
walls to white wash and treat with antiseptic chemicals.67 The genuine 
organic farmer or processor risks closure or operation as a rogue 
facility.68 
These regulatory obstacles are outside the reach of antitrust 
authorities. At the same time, timid merger enforcement was complicit 
in creating the oligopolistic conditions that surround USDA regulation. 
Regulators of meat products respond to the industry, but presumably 
do not seek to change its structure or the power distribution within 
that industry. Consider how food regulation might differ if a large per-
centage of meat products—say 20 percent or more—were raised, 
slaughtered, and brought to market in accord with more traditional 
animal husbandry practices. A less concentrated processing industry 
would likely respond more flexibly to consumer demand, offering more 
choices. USDA regulation that is now designed for large plant meat 
 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 228–29. 
66.  Id. at 229. 
67. Id. at 228–30 (describing the difficulties that a small, organic processor of 
chickens confronts in complying with USDA regulations). 
68. Some pioneers in organic and naturally raised animals have tried to thread the 
regulatory and oligopoly obstacles by establishing direct, farm to table options. 
For example, a direct ranch to table distribution system for grass-fed beef was 
established by Colorado rancher Mike Callicrate. Protocol, Callicrate 
Cattle Co., http://www.callicratecattleco.com/Protocol.htm [https://perma. 
cc/P3LX-CKQ4] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017). 
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processing would be forced to adjust to consumer demand for organic 
farming practices. 
The Justice Department, in its 2012 report on competition in 
agriculture, acknowledged special monopsony issues in agriculture 
mergers.69 That report, however, stopped well short of recognizing the 
unique vulnerability of the small producer to monopsony power and the 
need for more stringent controls of mergers that increase buying power. 
The Cargill case is a classic case of neglect of the buyer-power issue.70 
Seen only from a short-term consumer price perspective, further con-
centration of beef packers may have seemed benign. From the 
perspective of cattle ranchers or consumers wishing more choice in how 
cattle are raised and slaughtered, the picture is starkly altered. The 
merging firms could, by reducing a rancher’s alternatives, place down-
ward pressure on prices paid for cattle. If only a portion of the reduced 
costs were passed on to consumers, the oligopolistic beef packers could 
expect higher margins and profits. 
The Justice Department Report also failed to recognize the 
difficulties faced by affected producers who might seek antitrust relief. 
Most contract farmers, for example, are afraid to act publicly to 
question the actions of the processor on whom they depend. The class 
action enforcement vehicle is becoming less viable as the Supreme Court 
has made rulings that limit the availability of class action relief. The 
Court’s decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant71 
invites processors to insert no-class-action clauses in their contracts 
with farmers to prevent both arbitration and litigation on a class action 
basis.72 Changes in substantive law add to these difficulties. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross Simons 
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc.73 created a heavy burden on any atomistic 
seller alleging predatory buying practices.74 These changes in the law 
governing private enforcement of the Sherman Act place increased 
importance on prophylactic merger enforcement that could lessen the 
occurrence of power abuses in agriculture. The question remains 
 
69. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competition and Agriculture: Voices from 
the Workshops on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement in 
Our 21st Century Economy and Thoughts on the Way Forward 
18–19, 21 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/ 
05/16/283291.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VTQ-SBU9]. 
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
71. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
72. Id. at 2309–12. 
73. 549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
74. Id. at 318–20. 
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whether invigorated enforcement, assuming it were to occur, would be 
too late to preserve or restore a competitive market structure. 
B. Healthcare 
The United States has by far the most expensive healthcare in the 
world.75 Even after implementation of the Affordable Care Act, the 
system fails to provide healthcare for all of its citizens.76 Measures of 
health outcomes also suggest that the United States lags behind most 
developed nations. Based on data from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development in 2010—gathered before the Afford-
able Care Act was enacted—the United States had by far the highest 
per capita spending on healthcare, drug prices, and cost per hospital 
visit of the twelve developed nations gathered. Yet the United States 
performed near the middle on case-specific hospital mortality and poor-
ly on hospital admissions for chronic conditions and amputations due 
to diabetes.77 Another study showed that, despite vastly higher per 
capita expenditures on healthcare, the United States ranked last, by a 
wide margin, among thirteen developed nations in averting preventable 
deaths—deaths from preventable diseases or complications.78 
 
75. U.S. expenditure and financing of healthcare represented 17.2 percent of gross 
domestic product in 2016, whereas Switzerland—the second highest—was 12.4 
percent. Health Expenditure and Financing, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation 
& Dev. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=SHA [https://perma. 
cc/5ESE-C87U]. 
76. In 2015, 9.1 percent of the US population had no health insurance for any portion 
of the year. U.S. Census Bureau, P60-257 (RV), Health Insurance 
Coverage in the United States: 2015 3 (2016), https:/ 
/www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-257.html [https://perma. 
cc/W9Y3-A2Z3]. 
77. David A. Squires, The U.S. Health System in Perspective: A Comparison of 
Twelve Industrialized Nations, Commonwealth Fund: Issues Int’l 
Health Pol’y, July 2011, at 1, 2. The same source reports that the U.S. 
performed very well for survival rates in cervical, breast, and colorectal cancer. 
Other variables affect these comparative statistics. For example, U.S. dietary 
habits are likely to have contributed to the poor results for diabetes-related 
ailments. On the other hand, wider health insurance coverage could have 
improved diabetes outcomes by providing patients with better information and 
preventive care. Id. New Zealand, which had the lowest healthcare expenditures 
among the twelve nations—barely more than a third of US per capita 
expenditures—had similar or superior outcomes for most measures of healthcare 
quality. Id. Compared to the U.S., New Zealand had similar five-year survival 
rates for cervical cancer but slightly lower survival rates for breast and 
colorectal cancer. Id. at 10. 
78. Melissa Etehad & Kyle Kim, The U.S. Spends More on Healthcare Than Any 
Other Country—But Not With Better Health Outcomes, L.A. Times (July 18, 
2017, 4:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-healthcare-comparison-
20170715-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/7FHL-47WA] (citing a study of the 
European 
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At the start of the U.S. healthcare supply chain are many atomistic 
doctors, therapists, and medical professionals. At the other end are 
consumers. In the middle, however, are some highly concentrated oli-
gopolies playing key roles, including hospitals, health insurers, drug 
manufacturers, retail pharmacies, and prescription benefit managers. 
Further complications are presented by the patent system covering new 
drugs—a system of health insurance that dulls patient incentives to 
bargain for quality care at the best price—the difficulty consumers have 
in rating the quality of medical service and treatments, and the complex 
regulatory overlay. 
Although the enforcement agencies have been proactive in recent 
years in challenging mergers that would result in further consolidation 
by hospitals, insurers, prescription management firms, and pharma-
ceutical manufacturers,79 their efforts may be too little too late.80 In 
some instances, well-grounded challenges to mergers have met resist-
ance in the courts.81 In other instances, the agencies failed to challenge 
 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policy). The study showed that for 2013, the 
U.S. had 112 preventable deaths per 100,000. Among the other twelve developed 
nations, the preventable deaths ranged from fifty-five to eighty-five. Id. 
79. FTC & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2015, 
at 1, 15–18, 20–22, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal- 
trade-commission-bureau-competition-department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-
scott-rodino/160801hsrreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB4S-DJNB] (showing that 
of the twenty-two FTC merger challenges, eleven involved healthcare industry 
mergers). In 2017, the Justice Department was successful in blocking two major 
health insurance mergers: Anthem’s attempt to combine with Cigna, Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C. Circuit Affirms Decision Blocking Anthem’s 
Acquisition of Cigna (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dc-
circuit-affirms-decision-blocking-anthem-s-acquisition-cigna [https://perma.cc/ 
GL69-DTTJ], and Aetna’s attempt to combine with Humana, United States v. 
Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017). 
80. A number of critics conclude that high hospital prices are linked to lessened 
competition in local hospital markets. Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain’t 
Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 34 
(December 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Case Western 
Reserve Law Review); Leemore Dafny et al., The Price Effects of Cross-Market 
Hospital Mergers 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
22106, 2017); Tim Xu et al., The Potential Hazards of Hospital Consolidation: 
Implications for Quality, Access, and Price, 314 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1337, 
1338 (2015). 
81. The enforcement failures of the 1990s include FTC v. Tenet Heathcare Corp., 186 
F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated 
as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. 
Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997). More recently, 
the FTC failed in two district court rulings but succeeded on appeal in obtaining 
preliminary injunctions halting proposed hospital mergers. FTC v. Penn State 
Hershey Med. Ctr., 185 F. Supp. 3d 552 (M.D. Pa. 2016), rev’d, 838 F.3d 327 (3d 
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mergers that resulted in price increases. In his review of retrospective 
studies of mergers, John Kwoka concluded that price increases from 
hospital mergers, along with mergers involving journals and airlines, 
were likely to involve the highest increases in prices.82 Price increases 
to consumers, however, are likely only one of the anticompetitive effects 
of concentration in the mid-levels of the distribution chain. Choices and 
effects on quality of care, although more difficult to quantify, are 
likely.83 
There are substantial advantages to being a solo-practicing 
physician. One can maintain control over treatment of individual 
patients, avoiding the “turnstile” medicine associated with corporate 
practice. To maximize revenues, a corporate practice may favor more 
profitable treatments over equally or more effective ones or it may re-
quire a patient to return for separate visits to deal with multiple 
diagnosed problems.84 A solo-practicing physician can place patient in-
terest above financial gain and treat all problems in a single visit. Even 
with this financial sacrifice, at least for some specialists, monetary 
incentives still favor a doctor’s solo practice. One Southern California 
allergist estimated that a solo-practicing doctor in his line, once the 
practice was established, could easily earn two or three times more than 
a salaried colleague in corporate practice.85 
Despite these substantial advantages to solo practice, most young 
doctors do not choose this option.86 Consider the motivated medical 
 
Cir. 2016); FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, No. 15 C 11473, 2016 WL 
3387163 (N.D. Ill. 2016), rev’d, 841 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2016).  
82. John E. Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A 
Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy 154–55 (2015). 
83. Tim Xu et al., supra note 80, at 1337–38. 
84. Current Medicare payment practices invite this multiple visit scheme. The 
author is grateful for information provided by interviews with solo-practicing 
physicians for this insight. See also Tamara B. Hayford, The Impact of Hospital 
Mergers on Treatment Intensity and Health Outcomes, 47 Health Servs. 
Res. 1008, 1026 (2012) (finding that “hospital mergers are associated with 
greater treatment intensity, both in the type of treatment utilized and in the 
number of procedures [patients] received during a hospital stay,” and “increased 
utilization of intensive surgeries”). 
85. The author is grateful to a solo-practicing Southern California allergist for these 
insights. Notes of the interview are on file with the author. 
86. “The share of solo practices” for family physicians “fell to 18 percent in 2008 from 
44 percent in 1986.” Gardiner Harris, Family Physician Can’t Give Away Solo 
Practice, N.Y. Times, (April 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/04/23/health/23doctor.html [https://perma.cc/Y4QC-U5TF]. Despite this 
downturn, the American Academy of Family Physicians still maintains a link on 
its website specifically designed to assist the solo practitioner or small group 
practice. American Academy of Family Physicians, http://www.aafp. 
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school graduate who might prefer to start her own practice. Because of 
large debt coming out of medical school, she is reluctant to incur an 
even greater debt required to carry her through the cash-strapped 
startup years. Banks, recognizing the new realities of private practice, 
may be reluctant to lend a young doctor the needed startup funds.87 
The lure of an immediate salary from an HMO or corporate practice, 
despite its relatively modest amount, is substantial. The control 
exercised by oligopsonistic health insurance companies and large hos-
pitals increases the risks of going the private-practice route. Health 
insurance companies “own” the patient. If the solo-practicing physician 
is unwilling to accept the payment rate offered by the insurer, the 
patient will often switch to a different doctor. Meanwhile, the doctor 
has no leverage to negotiate with the insurer;88 the insurer presents the 
payment package to the doctor on a “take it or leave it” basis. 
Consumer choice, entry, quality of service, and quality of life all can be 
adversely affected. 
Depending on a doctor’s specialty, access to a hospital can be an 
issue for a solo-practicing physician. The doctor may have some lever-
age if there is competition among competing hospitals. That leverage 
quickly dissipates when oligopolistic conditions develop among local 
hospitals.89 To avoid the pitfalls of exclusion or take-it-or-leave-it terms 
from power-wielding hospitals, the physician is once again pushed away 
from solo practice and toward a corporate or large group practice. 
The point is not that small or solo-practicing physicians always 
perform better than large group or hospital practices. Indeed, the ranks 
of small practice doctors include their share of incompetent physicians, 
or even some who engage in fraud. Some family physicians believe that 
they can perform better when a group practice lightens their load of 
patients and gives them better access to peer guidance.90 But small 
practices also include some top performing doctors who prefer to 
operate independently and who have loyal patients who prefer the small 
practice setting. Choice should be preserved for both practicing phy-
sicians and for their patients. 
 
org/practice-management/administration/central.html [https://perma.cc/526Y-
3X7X] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017). 
87. Harris, supra note 86 (noting that even if young doctors want to start a private 
practice, “banks—attuned to the growing uncertainties—are far less likely to 
lend the money needed.”). 
88. Id. (“[L]arge group practices can negotiate higher fees from insurers . . . .”). 
89. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). Hyde 
was a solo-practicing anesthesiologist who was excluded from the hospital when 
the hospital contracted exclusively with a group-practicing firm. Id. at 5. 
90. See Harris, supra note 86 (quoting a family practitioner who left a two-person 
practice for a government job). 
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If the United States is committed to a competitive healthcare 
economy, eliminating oligopsonistic conditions in industries such as 
health insurance and hospitals is vital. Unless these concerns are 
addressed, the young medical school graduate will have strong dis-
incentives to starting her own practice. Her life style preference is 
thwarted, a loss in and of itself, but one that is directly connected to 
performance and the quality of the services that she will provide to 
patients. In Canada, where a single payer system is in effect, a 
substantially larger percentage of physicians are in solo or small prac-
tices,91 an indication that many doctors prefer this mode of practice 
when the system does not deter it. 
Healthcare antitrust guidelines adopted by the federal antitrust 
agencies have operated as a perverse incentive for doctors to affiliate. 
Responding to pressure of large insurance companies and hospitals, 
doctors have sought, without the protection of the labor laws, to form 
cooperative groups to negotiate reimbursement rates. The Healthcare 
Guidelines seek to address this form of cooperative rate negotiation,92 
but do so by encouraging affiliations and cooperative arrangements 
thought to make medical practice more efficient. The underlying 
premise of these regulations is that price fixing, or joint rate 
negotiation, should be permitted only when there are offsetting 
efficiencies derived from integration of physician practice.93 However 
well intended, the guidelines operate as a regulatory scheme to 
encourage integration or consolidation of medical practices and a disin-
centive to solo-practicing or small practice physicians. 
On more than a few occasions, antitrust has thwarted oppressed 
sellers’ collective efforts to protect their interests. Most individual 
entrepreneurs or small businesses are not protected by labor law ex-
emptions, so collective action as a response to oligopsony power has 
been attacked as an unlawful antitrust conspiracy.94 The case law 
 
91. Compare National Physician Survey, 2004, Nat’l Physician Surv., http:// 
nationalphysiciansurvey.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/NPS2004-National-by-
Prov-Binder.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR7G-VB4J] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) 
(finding that in Canada in 2004, 32 percent of physicians were in solo practice 
and 54 percent were in group practice), with Harris, supra note 86 (finding that 
as of 2008, in the U.S. only 18 percent of family practitioners were in solo 
practice). 
92. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement 
Policy in Health Care 43 (Aug. 1996). 
93. Id. at 71–73. 
94. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 431–32 (1990) 
(holding that the association of court appointed lawyers who represented indigent 
defendants violated the Sherman Act and the FTC Act by engaging in collective 
boycott in a wage dispute); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 
348–49 (1982) (holding that doctors who collectively set insurance reimbursement 
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suggests the Supreme Court has been somewhat more forgiving when 
buyers engage in collective action.95 The Justice Department’s Health-
care Guidelines seem an apt example of the disfavored treatment of 
collective actions by sellers. 
To be sure, there can be benefits from integration of medical 
practices, including a sharing of patient records or the development of 
sound treatment protocols. Treatment protocols, however, can force 
physicians to comply with a regimen that is profitable but not 
necessarily effective or cost efficient. In some cases, these protocols may 
perversely undermine treatment in areas where experimentation may 
be legitimate and where medical science has not reached a clear consen-
sus. In other cases, the coordination may result in doctors choosing a 
form of treatment that is more profitable for the practice but less 
advantageous for the patient.96 For example, a policy that encourages 
or requires participating doctors to use expensive treatments when 
equally or more effective treatments are available, or refuses to allow a 
doctor to deal with more than one health condition during a single visit.  
Other benefits from an integrated practice might be achieved in 
ways that do not penalize the small practice. For example, sharing of 
patients’ records can be efficient and advantageous to both the doctor 
and patient. But record sharing should not be confined to the limits of 
an integrated practice. A better solution might facilitate universal 
sharing of records among all medical professionals, regardless of their 
affiliation with a particular practice. 
The Guidelines were not intended to discriminate against small 
medical practices. Unfortunately, that is one of their effects. In seeking 
a solution for the inequality of bargaining between doctors, on the one 
 
fees for various medical procedures committed a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act). 
95. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 
U.S. 284, 298 (1985); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610–
11 (1972) (holding that the joint purchasing and marketing arrangement 
violated Section 1, not because of efficient purchasing, but because of the 
territorial exclusivity accorded to member stores); Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1945) (holding that the joint procurement of news 
stories alone was not a violation of antitrust laws, but stringent entry rules were 
a violation). For additional analysis for the harsher treatment of joint selling 
when compared with joint purchasing, see Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman 
Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small Players’ Collective Action as 
a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 Antitrust L.J. 195, 216–25 (2001); 
Masterman, supra note 6, at 1409–13. 
96. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; Chad Terhune, Americans Waste 
$200 Billion Every Year on Medical Tests They Don’t Need, Experts Say, L.A. 
Times (May 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
medical-tests-20170526-story.html [https://perma.cc/VXX2-L5R8] (“Some 
experts estimate that at least $200 billion is wasted annually on excessive 
testing and treatment.”). 
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hand, and oligopsonistic insurance providers and hospitals, on the other 
hand, the agencies have crafted a toxic and very much regulatory 
scheme that favors integrated medical practices over small group or solo 
practicing physicians. The Guidelines do not directly address the 
underlying problem that gave rise to doctor cooperative schemes: the 
increasing level of concentration among health insurers and hospitals 
with which doctors must deal. 
The problems confronting the delivery of healthcare go well beyond 
merger policy. Still, core problems, such as concentration in ownership 
of hospitals and health insurance firms, can be traced to past failures 
in merger enforcement. Future merger policy, by lessening oligop-
sonistic dominance in the middle of the distribution chain, must be part 
of the solution. The choice to be a solo practitioner should be preserved 
for those doctors who prefer this way of practicing and patients who 
prefer this way of receiving medical care. 
C. Communications and Entertainment 
The digital age has fundamentally changed lives. The digital world 
is a central part of how people communicate, gather and share 
information, and find videos and other forms of entertainment. The 
digital communications business has fallen largely into the hands of 
large and oligopolistic firms, subject to considerable government 
regulation. Still, where competition reigns, there is less need for 
regulation. The cell phone industry is an example. Large firms dominate 
this industry, but there is sufficient competition and dynamism to pro-
vide consumers with meaningful service choices without heavy handed 
government regulation.97 
In other sectors of communication, competition has been lacking.98 
High speed internet connections, for many consumers, are unavailable,99  
or can be obtained only from a single provider. Subscription cable TV—
although competitively threatened by video streaming through the 
 
97. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit to 
Block AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile (Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-antitrust-lawsuit-block-att-s-acquisition-t-
mobile [https://perma.cc/L75D-D5QS] (calling T-Mobile “an important source 
of competition among the national carriers, including through innovation and 
quality enhancements”).  
98. See Susan Crawford, Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and 
Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age 9–10 (2013) (describing the 
monopoly risks arising from control of the internet pipeline by large, vertically 
integrated firms). 
99. According to the FCC, 10 percent of all Americans lack access to 25 Mbps/3 
Mbps service. FCC, 2016 Broadband Progress Report, 31 FCC Rcd. 699, 731 
(2016). 
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internet—continues to force consumers to purchase high-priced bundles 
containing mostly channels that they will never watch.100 
There is creative atomism at the start of the entertainment 
distribution chain: authors, composers, artists, script writers, musi-
cians, actors, and athletes develop and nurture their own skills.101 
Although some work for large corporations, many remain tenaciously 
independent. A major issue for these creators is their ability to get 
programming to the public. To do so requires negotiating the hurdles 
of vertically integrated firms that control distribution and favor their 
own content or demand discriminatory ransom.102 The owners of 
independent channels, such as Wealth TV, have publicly complained of 
difficulties in obtaining distribution.103 
Although some may view merger enforcement as vigorous under the 
Obama Administration, its record with respect to communications was 
spotty. The Justice Department and the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) prevented AT&T’s proposed acquisition of T-
Mobile, thereby preserving a maverick competitor,104 and also thwarted 
Comcast’s proposed acquisition of Time Warner Cable.105 On the other 
hand, the agencies allowed, subject to conditions, Comcast’s acquisition 
 
100. See Warren S. Grimes, The Distribution of Pay Television in the United States: 
Let an Unshackled Marketplace Decide, 5 J. Int’l. Media & Ent. L. 1, 3–4 
(2013). 
101. See supra Part II.B. 
102. A 2007 study commissioned by the FCC found evidence that cable distributors 
are more likely to carry their own channels than those of rivals except in areas 
where there is adequate competition from satellite distributors. Austan 
Goolsbee, Vertical Integration and the Market for Broadcast 
and Cable Television Programming 31 (2007). The study also found a 
lack of evidence of efficiencies in vertical integration of program providers and 
distributors. Id. 
103. FCC, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8635 (2012). See also David 
Lazarus, Give Cable TV Subscribers More Freedom of Choice, L.A. Times 
(May 7, 2013), https:// http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/07/business/la-
fi-lazarus-20130507 [https://perma.cc/GXF8-T38S] (stating the complaints of 
the Chief Operating Officer of Ovation TV, whose arts and entertainment 
channel had been dropped by distributor Time Warner Cable). 
104. See Press Release, supra note 97. 
105. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Comcast Corp. Abandons Proposed Acquisition 
of Time Warner Cable After Justice Dep’t and the FCC Informed Parties of 
Concerns (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcast-corporation 
-abandons-proposed-acquisition-time-warner-cable-after-justice-department 
[https://perma.cc/LD9R-XPTV]. 
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of NBC Universal,106 AT&T’s acquisition of Direct TV,107 and Charter’s 
acquisition of Time Warner Cable.108 Despite well-intended conditions 
imposed on these transactions, the overall impact of these consoli-
dations was increased oligopoly power in the distribution chain.109 
Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Universal resulted in vertical 
integration of the country’s largest cable and Internet provider with 
one of the largest video content providers. Despite minimal horizontal 
issues in this merger, the combination has contributed to actual and 
potential strategic conduct that makes it more difficult for small 
content providers to get their video programming to consumers.110 
Competition would be best served if all distributors of video pro-
gramming, whether by cable subscription or internet streaming, were 
not vertically integrated into content supply. The fear that large 
distributors were not sufficiently neutral was the major impetus for net 
neutrality regulation.111 Comprehensive regulation might not be re-
quired if Comcast and other distributors had no conflict of interest in 
deciding which programming to carry. Competition is a more efficient 
 
106. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Dep’t Allows Comcast-NBCU Joint 
Venture to Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/justice-department-allows-comcast-nbcu-joint-venture-proceed-conditions 
[https://perma.cc/WQ3S-BFT9]. 
107. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Will Not Challenge AT&T’s 
Acquisition of DirecTV (July 21, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-will-not-challenge-atts-acquisition-directv [https://perma.cc/92MW-
E2CE]. 
108. Proposed Final Judgment at 5–6, United States v. Charter Commc’n, Inc., No. 16-
cv-00759 (D. D.C. Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/844851/ 
download [https://perma.cc/M2JV-ST7S] (permitting the merger but imposing 
certain restrictions on making video programming available to Internet providers). 
109. Professor Kwoka’s conclusion that non-divestiture remedies were notably 
ineffective in preventing price increases offers one reason for concern with these 
outcomes. Kwoka, supra note 82, at 156 (“Conduct remedies result in price 
increases of 12.81 percent, suggesting that these are largely ineffective in 
restraining postmerger price increases.”). 
110. See, e.g., Ryan Hatch, Yankees’ Opening Day: YES Network, Comcast Dispute 
Rages On, NJ (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.nj.com/yankees/index.ssf/2016/ 
04/yes_network_comcast_dispute_rages_as_yankees_open.html [https:// 
perma.cc/DWP9-CDB2].  
111. Proponents of Internet openness “fear that broadband providers might prevent 
their end-user subscribers from accessing certain edge providers altogether, or 
might degrade the quality of their end-user subscribers’ access to certain edge 
providers, either as a means of favoring their own competing content or services 
or to enable them to collect fees from certain edge providers.” U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Verizon v. FCC, 740 
F.3d 623, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). See generally Restoring Internet Freedom, 
FCC, www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet [https://perma.cc/U5AQ-CH6V] 
(explaining the FCC’s ideas on the principle of “Open Internet”). 
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and less onerous way to ensure that telecommunications firms serve the 
public interest, but competition can work only if mergers undermining 
a competitive structure are blocked. 
In November 2017, the Justice Department filed suit to challenge 
AT&T’s proposed acquisition of Time Warner.112 The vertical issues 
posed by this transaction are very similar to those addressed in 
Comcast’s 2011 acquisition of NBC Universal. This time around, the 
Antitrust Division—not satisfied with conduct remedies—insisted on a 
divestiture as a condition for permitting the transaction, and is now in 
litigation with AT&T.  The outcome of this case is uncertain, but the 
more aggressive effort to oppose vertical integration is amply justified 
by the record of abuses in this industry. 
AT&T and Direct TV were direct competitors in areas of the 
country served by AT&T’s U-verse fiber-optic cable. In allowing their 
merger, the Justice Department and FCC imposed as a condition that 
AT&T commit to extending its system of fiber-optic cable, thereby 
providing high-speed Internet access, or at least a choice in obtaining 
that access, to more U.S. consumers.113 Obtaining more competition and 
choices in high-speed Internet access is a critical policy goal. Even if 
the FCC might reasonably trade more internet access for a reduction 
in competition in providing cable or satellite TV, one wonders whether 
this is a legitimate interpretation of the Clayton Act, which prohibits 
acquisitions which may reduce competition in “any market” and does 
not authorize trading competition in one market for another.114 
Statutory interpretation aside, AT&T’s commitment to expand its 
fiber-optic network will be difficult to enforce and, by itself, likely will 
not lead to meaningful competition in high-speed Internet access. If the 
firm drags its feet in building out its network, there may be little in the 
way of sanctions that the FCC or the Antitrust Division can impose. 
This sort of regulatory decree is at odds with the principle that the 
preferred remedy is structural and with the preference for fixing the 
problem before the acquisition proceeds.115 Moreover, even if the fiber 
 
112. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, No. 1:17-cv-02511 (D. D.C. Nov. 20, 2017). 
113. AT&T Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 9131, 9278 (2015). 
114. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (stating that “[n]o person engaged 
in commerce . . . shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the 
stock or other share capital . . .  where in any line of commerce or in any activity 
affecting commerce . . . , the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” but creating no exception 
for uncertain benefits in a different industry).	  
115. The Antitrust Division does not require that a merger remedy involve fixing the 
underlying competitive problem before the merger proceeds, but notes that “[a] 
fix-it-first remedy eliminates the Division’s antitrust concerns and therefore the 
need to file a case.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy 
Guide to Merger Remedies 26 (2004).   
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network is completed, it will in many markets simply result in a 
duopoly. AT&T will have a strong incentive to price-in parallel to its 
rival. Meaningful choice and meaningful price competition seem a pipe 
dream.116 A more comprehensive solution to providing affordable and 
high-quality high-speed Internet may require across the board regu-
latory or legislative relief. Meanwhile, the enforcers have given up 
competition in the subscription cable TV market for highly uncertain 
benefits in internet access. 
Another content-stifling feature of video programming is the 
cumbersome bundles that are imposed on cable TV subscribers. These 
bundling practices are yet another example of mid-stream power, 
wielded at the expense of both creators at the beginning of the 
distribution chain and consumers at the end. The power is with 
oligopolistic content firms that require distributors to carry large 
bundles of their channels in the basic distribution tier, preventing dis-
tributors from offering a la carte choices. The coercive nature of the 
power these firms exercise over subscribers is reflected in a comment of 
a television executive who declared that customers would “give up food 
and a roof over their head before they give up TV.”117 Concentration at 
both content and distribution levels makes it more difficult for an 
innovative maverick to offer consumers more choices. 
The Antitrust Division has substantial expertise and interest in 
competition in telecommunications services. The address by former 
Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer, focusing on the need for 
competition and neutrality among internet pipeline providers, was 
helpful.118 But more is needed. The goal of achieving clarity and 
certainty would be fostered by policy statements addressing telecom-
munications mergers and other related competition issues. Levels of 
 
116. Under President Obama, the FCC sought to encourage local communities to 
build their own high-speed networks, even beyond the borders of their 
municipality, taking the position that state legislation obtained by incumbent 
monopolists to block such development is preempted by the FCC’s statutory 
authority. Incumbent internet service providers, who did not relish the 
competition, successfully challenged the FCC in court. See Press Release, FCC, 
Chairman Wheeler Statement on Municipal Broadband Court Decision (Aug. 
10, 2016), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/ 
db0810/DOC-340738A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM9P-X7NA]. 
117. Meg James, Fox’s Chase Carey Calls a la Carte Programming ‘a Fantasy’, L.A. 
Times (Aug. 8, 2013),  http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/08/entertainment/ 
la-et-ct-foxs-chase-carey-calls-ala-carte-a-fantasy-20130808 [https://perma.cc/ 
6LJ7-38JS]. A younger generation of cord cutters or never corders put pressure on 
cable TV distributors and programmers to offer more choices. The anticompetitive 
bundling practices of the industry, however, have endured for decades and may 
continue for many more years. See Grimes, supra note 100. 
118. See Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Video Competition: 
Opportunities and Challenges 6–8 (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/file/782401/download [https://perma.cc/F2S8-CL25]. 
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concentration that may be tolerable in some industries are objectionable 
in a service and creative component industry so vital to consumers. 
Vertical integration that may be relatively unproblematic in some 
industries is likely to be troublesome when providers of popular content 
wield such leverage over distributors. 
IV. Why Small Firms Thrive in the Beer & Wine 
Industries 
A relatively open distribution system can be critical for new entry 
and entrepreneurial choice. The beer and wine industries provide a 
compelling example. Both of these industries involve a creative com-
ponent and winemakers, like farmers, are often growers. Small craft 
brewers and winemakers have enjoyed a strong resurgence. Antitrust 
enforcement, however, may have had little to do with protecting the 
opportunities of new entrants in these industries. 
During the populist enforcement era of the 1960s, the Justice 
Department was aggressive in challenging beer mergers, among them 
an acquisition that would have created the nation’s fifth largest brewer 
with 4.49 percent of the national market.119 The Government, successful 
in the Supreme Court, argued that in Wisconsin, the merger would have 
created the largest brewer with 24 percent of the market.120 This state 
market was harshly criticized as gerrymandered and inconsistent with 
market realities.121 Attention to concentration at the state level was 
consistent with state regulatory control and might have created a more 
favorable distribution platform for the subsequent emergence of craft 
brewing, but that was not to be. As merger enforcement standards were 
relaxed, multiple mergers produced today’s highly concentrated beer 
industry. Two firms, Anheuser-Busch InBev and Miller Coors, had 70 
percent of the beer sales in the United States as of 2016.122 
Notwithstanding relaxed merger policies that produced a tight 
oligopoly, the craft beer revolution was enabled by strict state control 
over vertical integration. The 21st Amendment to the Constitution 
 
119. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550 (1966). 
120. Id. 
121. Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market 
Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 Antitrust Bull. 45, 81 (1973). 
122. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Requires Anheuser-Busch InBev to 
Divest Stake in MillerCoors and Alter Beer Distrib. Practices as Part of 
SABMiller Acquisition (July 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-requires-anheuser-busch-inbev-divest-stake-millercoors-and-alter-
beer [https://perma.cc/2JK3-WJAQ]. Molson, as a result of the divestiture 
required by the Antitrust Division, is the majority stakeholder of all of Miller’s 
US operations. Id.  
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repealed prohibition and gave each state control over the production 
and sale of alcoholic beverages.123 At that time, many states adopted a 
mandatory three-tier system, prohibiting vertical integration of pro-
ducers, distributors, and retailers.124 Maintaining independently owned 
distributors makes it more difficult for powerful producers to lock up 
distribution. There may be other advantages that explain the growth 
and survival of small producers, but the open availability of distribution 
channels is an important part of this story. While distribution was not 
open in all states, the three-tier system was sufficiently rooted to enable 
the craft beer resurgence over the past two decades. 
Small and regional breweries—called microbreweries—now control 
roughly 14 percent of the U.S. market by volume.125 Unlike farmers or 
ranchers, microbrewers typically do not grow or raise their own ingre-
dients, but exercise their craft as processors. To have a chance to 
distribute efficiently, such brewers require access to effective distribu-
tion, particularly when a brewer hopes to reach a market beyond its 
home state.126 Even in states in which dominant brewers cannot own 
 
123. U.S. Const. amend. XXI. 
124. The ABInBev/SABMiller Merger and the State of Competition in the Beer 
Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and 
Consumer Rights, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1, 3 (2015) 
(statement of Bob Pease, Chief Executive Officer, Brewers Association) (noting 
that ABInBev owns wholesalers in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington). Only fifteen states allow 
beer producers to own distributorships. Id. at 2. 
125. Stephen Wilmot, Craft Beer Slowdown Is No Help to Big Brewers, Wall St. J. 
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-craft-brewing-slowdown-
wont-benefit-big-beer-1472187785 [https://perma.cc/UUA2-88ZT] (reporting 
that craft brewers continue to grow but at a slower rate). At the beginning of 
1980, there were about ten microbreweries, but by 2016, there were 3,132. 
Victor J. Tremblay & Carol Horton Tremblay, The U.S. Brewing 
Industry: Data and Economic Analysis 103 (2005); Number of Breweries, 
Brewers Ass’n, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/number-of-
breweries/ [https://perma.cc/6UB8-WEVJ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
126. The repeal of prohibition gave states the authority to regulate the production and 
sale of alcoholic beverages. U.S. Const. amend. XXI. Many states responded 
with laws that prohibited a brewer from owning its own distributor. See, e.g., 
Heather Morton, Three-Tier Cheers!, St. Legislatures Mag. (June 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/three-tier-cheers-
635689375.aspx [https://perma.cc/P8UB-SEA3] (explaining that states have 
strengthened laws to keep distributors independent from producers); Andrew Gill, 
Craft Brewers Win Small Victory in Springfield, but the Real Winners are 
Distributors, WBEZ News (June 4, 2013), http://www.wbez.org/news/ 
culture/craft-brewers-win-small-victory-springfield-real-winners-are-distributors-
107514 [https://perma.cc/CFG7-VB9R] (explaining that in Springfield, IL, 
“brewers were prohibited from owning any interest in beer or liquor distributors”). 
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distributors, a dominant brewer may pressure independent distributors 
to exclude or disfavor smaller rival brewers. 
In permitting Anheuser Busch InBev’s acquisition of Miller 
Brewing, the Antitrust Division imposed a divestiture remedy to 
address horizontal concentration and a conduct remedy designed to 
protect microbrewers’ access to independent beer distributors.127 The 
decree prohibits Anheuser Busch from engaging in certain loyalty or 
discount programs that discourage independent beer distributors from 
doing business with other brewers and requires Anheuser Busch not to 
acquire other brewers or distributors without allowing for advance re-
view by the Antitrust Division.128 The sensitivity the Division showed 
to distribution issues affecting microbrewers was constructive but in-
sufficient.129 Whether the conduct remedy will be effective in preventing 
the large firm’s future exclusionary treatment punishing smaller rivals 
is an open question.130 
The real lesson from the Anheuser Busch/Miller acquisition may be 
a failure in past merger enforcement. Consider an industry in which, 
instead of a 70 percent dominance by two firms, there are eight firms 
that share roughly 80 percent of the U.S. market. In such an industry, 
issues of vertical integration are far less troublesome. If one or more of 
these eight firms decided to acquire its own distributors, there is much 
less risk that the firm would use its control of a distributor strategically 
to injure a microbrewer. To the contrary, with a share of 20 percent or 
less of the market, the firm is more likely to reach out to other brewers 
to offer them distribution, in this manner profiting from a greater share 
in the distribution market. Under these more competitive conditions, 
the market is more likely to self-regulate, and do so in a more effective 
manner than through merger conditions imposed on a powerful 
oligopolist. 
The wine industry in the United States also benefits from the 
independent distribution system that grew out of the 21st Amendment. 
The largest three wine firms control roughly 46 percent of the US 
market,131 but the industry is relatively unconcentrated, with at least 
 
127. See Press Release, supra note 122. 
128. Id. 
129. Given the problems in maintaining open distribution, the Department would 
have been justified in prohibiting Anheuser Busch/Miller from acquiring any 
craft brewer for a substantial period of years. 
130. Kwoka found conduct remedies were largely ineffective in preventing price 
increases by the merged firm. Kwoka, supra note 82, at 156. 
131. Rob McMillan, State of Industry Wine Report 2016 42 (2016). 
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one winery in each of the fifty states132 and a steady growth in the 
number of firms—an average increase of 7 percent per year in the ten 
years ending in 2012.133 While large firms dominate the low-price 
market, small and boutique firms have a large presence in the mid- and 
high-priced categories.134 
Entry barriers are said to be high for the lower priced segment of 
the market because of the large investment needed in plant, equipment, 
vineyards, and advertising.135 But a much smaller investment can get a 
new winemaker into the mid or high-priced wine market.136 While some 
smaller wine makers sell their wine directly to retailers or end con-
sumers, 90 percent of all wine flows through distributors.137 The largest 
twenty distributors have 75 percent of the market, with several hundred 
smaller distributors sharing the remainder.138 
Although price competition seems to discipline the low-end market, 
for mid- and high-price segments, conditions of monopolistic compe-
tition prevail: each distinctive brand enjoys substantial pricing 
freedom.139 These conditions complement the availability of independ-
ent distributors and make it possible for new entrants to succeed and 
consumers to choose among an increasing number of local brands. These 
benefits will continue as long as merger policy, and antitrust 
enforcement more generally, preserves the availability of independent 
distribution for small wineries. 
The beer and wine industries are examples of creative mid-level 
processing that can be efficiently performed by individual entrepreneurs 
or small firms. What is needed is lower thresholds for horizontal 
concentration among processors. To the extent that these thresholds 
have already been exceeded, strict rules on vertical integration are 
required to maintain open entry for small processors. 
V. The Way Forward 
Stacy Mitchell describes a small, dedicated North Dakota 
pharmacist who operates a pharmacy serving a town with 500 residents. 
 
132. James Thornton, American Wine Economics: An Exploration of 
the U.S. Wine Industry 2 (2013). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 3. 
135. Id. at 3–4. 
136. Don Cyr et al., The Changing Size Distribution of California’s North Coast 
Wineries, 9 J. Wine Econ. 51, 60 (2014). 
137. Thornton, supra note 132, at 3. 
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139. Id. at 185–86. 
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To reach a larger customer base, the pharmacist opened a telepharmacy 
ten miles down the road, making the drive once or twice a day to deliver 
prescriptions.140 The return on this sort of business model is unlikely to 
attract large chain pharmacies, but this entrepreneur may have been 
assisted by a 1960s North Dakota law that limits pharmacy ownership 
to those who are licensed pharmacists.141 Conventional antitrust wisdom 
would condemn this law as protectionist: it would seem to protect 
inefficient small pharmacies from competition by large pharmacy chains 
that operate in most of the rest of the country. But the North Dakota 
law apparently has had a pro-competitive effect. Mitchell cites evidence 
that North Dakota has lower prescription drug prices than its neighbor 
South Dakota, where chain pharmacies are allowed, and most of the 
rest of the United States.142 
A credible explanation for this result is that, in most of the country, 
the majority of retail pharmacies are owned by a few large chains that, 
rather than compete on price, are tacitly following oligopolistic pricing 
policies that enhance their profits. North Dakota, it turns out, may be 
the beneficiary of apparently protectionist legislation that has prevent-
ed its pharmacies from falling into the hands of large oligopolists. In 
this manner, it has preserved competition among the many diverse 
pharmacy owners. 
The North Dakota story is consistent with the central theme 
explored here. Preserving entrepreneurial choice, particularly important 
for industries in which small entrepreneurs are suited, serves a number 
of fundamental antitrust goals: (1) preserving efficiency; (2) preserving 
small players who are central to innovation; (3) improving the quality 
of life for both those who sell and those who buy; and (4) protecting 
democratic values by diversifying wealth and power. 
The protectionist features of the North Dakota law do not rest 
comfortably with competition law. That state’s experience, however, 
highlights the inadequacies of a merger control policy that allows 
mergers to tight oligopoly. In particular, enforcement policies and court 
cases have given insufficient attention to oligopsony abuses that dis-
criminate against small businesses or sole providers. The problem is 
acute in industries suited to small entrepreneurship, including those in 
which owner operation is a key advantage and those with a strong serv-
ice or creative component. Such industries include, but are not limited 
to, agriculture, healthcare, and communications and entertainment. 
To protect entrepreneurial choice for these industries, enforcement 
agencies must implement tightened horizontal merger thresholds. Con-
centration should be measured in geographic markets in which the small 
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business can reasonably market its product or service. In industries in 
which horizontal concentration is already high, enforcers must act 
assertively to prevent vertical combinations that provide both incentive 
and opportunity for exclusionary conduct by the vertically integrated 
firm. Where large vertically integrated firms already exist, vigorous en-
forcement against exclusionary vertical practices will help to preserve 
entrepreneurial choice. Antitrust should shun regulatory or enforcement 
decisions that punish reasonable collective responses of small players 
who confront oppressive monopsony power. 
 
